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The Journal of Neuroscience, April 1, 2002, 22(7):2730-2736
The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions
Jorge
Moll1,
Ricardo
de Oliveira-Souza1,
Paul J.
Eslinger2,
Ivanei E.
Bramati1,
Janaína
Mourão-Miranda1, 3,
Pedro
Angelo
Andreiuolo1, and
Luiz
Pessoa4
1 Neuroimaging and Behavioral Neurology Group,
Hospitais D'Or and LABS, RJ, 22281-081, Brazil,
2 Departments of Medicine (Division of Neurology),
Pediatrics, and Behavioral Science, Pennsylvania State University
College of Medicine, The Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, Hershey,
Pennsylvania 17033, 3 Carlos Chagas Filho Biophysics
Institute, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ,
21941, Brazil, and 4 Laboratory of Brain and
Cognition, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland
20892
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ABSTRACT |
Humans are endowed with a natural sense of fairness that permeates
social perceptions and interactions. This moral stance is so ubiquitous
that we may not notice it as a fundamental component of daily decision
making and in the workings of many legal, political, and social
systems. Emotion plays a pivotal role in moral experience by assigning
human values to events, objects, and actions. Although the brain
correlates of basic emotions have been explored, the neural
organization of "moral emotions" in the human brain remains poorly
understood. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a passive
visual task, we show that both basic and moral emotions activate the
amygdala, thalamus, and upper midbrain. The orbital and medial
prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus are also recruited
by viewing scenes evocative of moral emotions. Our results indicate
that the orbital and medial sectors of the prefrontal cortex and the
superior temporal sulcus region, which are critical regions for social
behavior and perception, play a central role in moral appraisals. We
suggest that the automatic tagging of ordinary social events with moral
values may be an important mechanism for implicit social behaviors in humans.
Key words:
moral judgment; fMRI; emotion; orbitofrontal; sociopathy; frontal lobes
 |
INTRODUCTION |
Recent theoretical developments in
moral psychology, which had been dominated by rationalistic theories
for centuries, have emphasized the role of emotion in models of moral
development and behavior (Gilligan, 1993 ; Haidt, 2001 ). "Moral
emotions" have been the focus of several recent experimental
psychology studies; they differ from basic emotions in that they are
intrinsically linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a
whole or of persons other than the agent (Damasio, 1994 ; de Waal, 1996 ; Rozin et al., 1999 ; Haidt, 2002 ). Moral emotions are readily evoked by
the perception of moral violations; it has been suggested that, in
contrast to laborious deductive reasoning, they enable rapid, automatic, and unconscious cognitive appraisals of interpersonal events
(Haidt, 2001 ).
Impaired socio-moral emotion and behavior has been consistently
observed in patients with frontal-lobe dysfunction, and may dissociate
from social cognition and moral knowledge (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985 ;
Price et al., 1990 ; Eslinger et al., 1992 ; Anderson et al., 1999 ).
Factors such as the age of the patient at the time of the injury and
the location of frontal-lobe damage appear to influence whether social
and moral cognition are also impaired. Analogous dissociations between
knowing how to behave and actually behaving in socially desirable ways
are observed in developmental sociopaths as well (Blair, 1995 ). In
addition, these individuals show a disproportionate impairment in the
ability to experience certain moral emotions (Blair et al., 1995 ).
Moreover, emotion-induced reflex epileptic seizures triggered
specifically by feelings related to unresolved moral issues have been
reported in association with right frontotemporal damage (Cohen et al., 1999 ). Together, these finding suggest the existence of brain networks
specialized for the generation of moral emotions.
Here we investigate the neural correlates of moral emotion in normal
individuals using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Because
damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) can result in a lack of
empathy and antisocial behaviors in the face of preserved social
cognition and basic emotions (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985 ; Saver and
Damasio, 1991 ; Eslinger et al., 1992 ), we hypothesized that this brain
region would be more activated by the visual perception of stimuli
evocative of moral emotions compared with emotional stimuli without
moral content and compared with non-emotional stimuli. In addition, we
predicted that basic and moral emotions would evoke overlapping
activations in brain regions involved in emotional processing, such as
the amygdala, insula, and subcortical nuclei (Damasio, 1994 ; Lane et
al., 1999 ; Damasio et al., 2000 ).
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MATERIALS AND METHODS |
Subjects. Seven right-handed adults [five men and
two women; age, 27 ± 3 years; education, 14 ± 2 years (results expressed as means ± SDs)] with no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders were studied. Subjects were not
paid for their participation. The study was conducted at Hospital Barra
D'Or and approved by the institutional review boards and ethics
committees of the hospital.
Stimuli and task. Subjects were scanned while viewing
pictures of emotionally charged scenes with and without moral content as well as emotionally neutral pictures. Because our goal was to
investigate spontaneous brain responses triggered by the perception of
visual stimuli, no responses were required from the subjects during
scanning; they were simply instructed to view the pictures attentively.
There were six experimental conditions: (1) moral pictures portraying
emotionally charged, unpleasant social scenes, representing moral
violations (e.g., physical assaults, poor children abandoned in the
streets, war scenes) (Haidt, 2002 ); (2) unpleasant pictures of aversive
scenes not conveying moral connotations (e.g., body lesions, dangerous
animals, body products) (Rozin et al., 1999 ); (3) pleasant pictures,
including scenes of people and landscapes; (4) "interesting"
pictures, which were visually arousing but less emotional (e.g.,
surreal images, radical sports); (5) neutral pictures, including people
and landscapes; and (6) scrambled images. Stimuli pertaining to these
categories were selected based on previous piloting behavioral
observations in a different group of normal subjects. After fMRI
scanning, subjects rated each picture for moral content, emotional
valence, and level of arousal on visual analog scales. Images were
presented through magnetically shielded liquid crystal display goggles
(Resonance Technologies, Northridge, CA) controlled by a computer. A
blocked design consisting of three pictures per block, each displayed
for 5 sec, was used. Eight blocks for each category were presented in a
fixed pseudorandomized order. A white cross-hair fixation on a black
background was displayed for 15 sec between each block to allow for a
complete return of the hemodynamic response to baseline levels. Most
pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System
(Lang et al., 1995 ). All pictures were presented again immediately
after the imaging session, and subjects rated them according to
predefined criteria. The rating dimensions, which were explained after
fMRI data acquisition, included emotional valence (from "extremely unpleasant" to "extremely pleasant"), level of arousal (from
"calm" to "excited"), and moral content (from "absent" to
"extreme"). Subjects were instructed to rate the pictures on these
dimensions according to their appraisal of the pictures when first
viewing them while in the scanner (1 corresponded to extremely
unpleasant/calm/absent and 10 corresponded to extremely
pleasant/excited/extreme). Explicit written instructions regarding the
rating of moral pictures were provided: "This item refers to the
presence and degree of moral content in the scene. This includes
actions which you consider to be commendable or regrettable, fair or
unfair, right or wrong, good or evil, or situations that evoke a sense
of friendship, betrayal, pity or care for others, humiliation,
gratitude, or indignation."
Behavioral data analysis. Mean ratings for moral content,
emotional valence, and arousal in each experimental condition were assessed by one-way analysis of covariance. Pairwise comparisons of means between conditions were evaluated post hoc with
Scheffé's test. A threshold of significance of p < 0.05 was adopted for all comparisons.
fMRI procedures. Anatomic data consisted of volumetric
T1-weighted gradient-echo images [repetition
time (TR)/echo time (TE) of 14/4.6 msec; matrix of 256 × 256; field of view (FOV) of 256 mm; thickness/gap of 1.25/0 mm;
n = 128 slices]. Functional data were acquired with
blood oxygen level dependent contrast-echoplanar imaging (TR/TE
of 4980/66 msec; matrix of 128 × 128; FOV of 256 mm;
thickness/gap of 5/0.25 mm; n = 16 slices). All imaging
data were obtained with a 1.5 tesla MRI scanner (Vision; Siemens,
Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a high-performance gradient
overdrive system. Warping of the echoplanar data was minimized by the
use of a fast gradient-switching system and by carefully performing a
three-dimensional localized shimming procedure before image acquisition
in each subject. The use of a higher-resolution matrix (128 × 128 instead of 64 × 64), maintaining a small FOV, also helps to
reduce image distortion at the base of the brain in echoplanar imaging.
As reported previously (Moll et al., 2001 ), these imaging parameters allowed adequate signal-to-noise levels in critical brain regions, such
as the anterior and inferior prefrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe
(including the amygdala), which was confirmed by carefully inspecting
the raw echoplanar data sets. Severe signal dropouts (>50%) were
observed in only a small part of the midlateral basal temporal lobe
(adjacent to the petrous temporal bone and mastoid cells) and in the
posterior portion of the medial basal/subgenual frontal cortex.
Therefore, the role of these brain regions in the brain processes
investigated here may have been underestimated, a ubiquitous issue in
current fMRI investigations. Functional data sets were motion-corrected
for three dimensions, and slice time correction, temporal smoothing,
linear trend removal, and spatial smoothing (isotropic Gaussian kernel,
6 mm full width at half maximum) were performed. Data sets were
coregistered and Talairach-transformed (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988 ).
Activation maps were analyzed using statistical parametric methods
(Friston et al., 1995 ) contained in the BrainVoyager version 4.4 software (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). Data
acquisition was synchronized with the stimulus presentation. Regressors
representing the experimental conditions of interest were modeled with
a hemodynamic response filter and entered into a multiple-regression
analysis using a fixed-effects model. Contrasts between conditions of
interest were assessed with t statistics. A minimum
three-dimensional cluster extent threshold of 50-100
mm3 was used to protect against type I
errors (Forman et al., 1995 ). Statistical parametric maps were overlaid
on two- and three-dimensional renderings of a representative
individual's brain.
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RESULTS |
Behavioral data
Analysis of behavioral data validated all experimental conditions
as members of the intended categories (Table
1). The moral content of the moral
pictures was rated as higher than that of any other picture set
(p < 0.00001). This result did not change after
arousal level and emotional valence were entered as covariates (F(5,856) = 38.71; p < 0.001), confirming that the moral content could be treated as a
valid independent category. Moral ratings were equivalent for
unpleasant, pleasant, interesting, and neutral conditions
(p > 0.22). Stimuli belonging to the moral and
unpleasant conditions were rated as having more negative emotional
valence (i.e., unpleasantness) than all other picture sets
(p < 0.00001). Furthermore, unpleasant stimuli
were rated as more unpleasant than the moral ones
(p < 0.00001). As expected, the pleasant
pictures were judged to have the most positive valence. Moral,
pleasant, unpleasant, and interesting conditions were associated with
equivalent degrees of arousal (p > 0.24) and
were significantly more arousing than the neutral condition
(p < 0.0001). This latter finding is important,
because the level of arousal appears to exert an effect on brain
activation that is partially independent of emotional valence (Lane et
al., 1999 ).
Common effects of moral and unpleasant conditions
We first used conjunction analysis to explore the common effects
of moral pictures and nonmoral unpleasant pictures relative to neutral
pictures (Price and Friston, 1997 ). Common effects were observed in a
network of limbic/paralimbic, subcortical, and cortical regions that
included the extended amygdala and upper midbrain bilaterally,
periaqueductal gray matter, right thalamus and superior colliculus,
right insula/inferior frontal gyrus [Brodmann area (BA) 44/45], right
anterior temporal cortex (BA 21/38), bilateral posterior
temporal-occipital cortex (BA 22/37/19), and right intraparietal sulcus (BA 7) (Fig. 1). These results
replicate previous functional imaging findings on the neural substrates
of unpleasant emotion (Lane et al., 1999 ; Damasio et al., 2000 ); they
also demonstrate that moral and basic unpleasant emotions share common
neural substrates. Accordingly, impaired emotional behavior has been
consistently observed after damage to the thalamus, amygdala, and
insula (Fukatsu et al., 1997 ; Adolphs, 1999 ; Calder et al., 2000 ).

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Figure 1.
Areas activated by both moral unpleasant and
basic unpleasant conditions relative to the neutral condition (assessed
with conjunction analysis) are shown. Activations were observed in the
amygdala, upper midbrain, right thalamus, superior colliculus,
extrastriate visual cortex, temporal neocortex, and insula (uncorrected
p < 0.0001; adjacent voxels in the cluster with
t > 3.61, p < 0.003; minimum
cluster volume of 100 mm3). In transversal and
coronal slices, the right side of the brain corresponds to the left
side of the figure.
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Specific effects of processing moral stimuli
Our main goal was to identify the brain regions that are
involved in moral processing, which was assessed by directly
contrasting the moral and unpleasant conditions. The most striking
findings were the increased activation of the right medial OFC and the medial frontal gyrus (MedFG) and the cortex surrounding the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) elicited by the moral in
comparison with the nonmoral unpleasant stimuli (Table
2, Fig. 2).
Indeed, viewing moral scenes consistently activated these regions
differentially, as revealed by contrasting the moral condition with
each of the neutral (Fig. 3), pleasant,
and interesting conditions. These findings support a specific role for
this network in processing moral stimuli, because the effects of
emotional valence and visual arousal were specifically controlled.

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Figure 2.
The areas shown are those activated by moral
versus unpleasant conditions; these areas included the medial
OFC/MedFG, superior temporal sulcus, and posterior middle temporal
gyrus of the right hemisphere (uncorrected p < 0.0001; adjacent voxels in the cluster with t > 3.61, p < 0.003; minimum cluster volume of 100 mm3).
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Figure 3.
Areas activated by moral versus neutral conditions
are shown. In addition to the prefrontal and temporal lobe activations,
there was also activation of the amygdala bilaterally, the midbrain,
extensive areas of the temporo-occipital cortex, and the precuneus
(uncorrected p < 0.0001; adjacent voxels in the
cluster with t > 3.61, p < 0.003; minimum cluster volume of 100 mm3).
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Specific effects of nonmoral unpleasant stimuli
To probe the brain regions more strongly activated by nonmoral
unpleasant than by moral pictures, the unpleasant condition was
compared with the moral condition. Nonmoral unpleasant stimuli (which
included mangled faces, a snake, and a dirty toilet) were evocative of
aversive emotions such as disgust and fear. The only brain regions
significantly more active for this contrast were the right middle
frontal gyrus and the right anterior insula (Table 2, Fig.
4). This latter finding concurs with
lesion and functional imaging studies, which suggest a critical role of
the anterior insula in disgust processing (Phillips et al., 1997 ;
Calder et al., 2000 ). Interestingly, no amygdala activation was
observed, suggesting that it was equally activated in unpleasant and
moral conditions. This could be explained by the presence of fearful stimuli in both conditions. As expected, when the basic unpleasant condition was contrasted with the neutral one, additional activations were observed in the amygdala, thalamus, and extrastriate visual cortex, brain regions shown in previous studies to be activated by
processing visual stimuli associated with unpleasant emotions (Lane et
al., 1999 ) (Fig. 5). No significant
OFC/MedFG activations were observed for these contrasts.

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Figure 4.
Areas activated by basic unpleasant versus moral
stimuli were observed only in the right anterior insula and adjacent
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (uncorrected p < 0.0001; adjacent voxels in the cluster with t > 3.61, p < 0.003; minimum cluster volume of 100 mm3).
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Figure 5.
When unpleasant stimuli were compared with the
neutral stimuli, activation was observed in both the amygdala and the
midbrain, as well as in the extrastriate visual cortex, in addition to
the right insula and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (uncorrected
p < 0.0001; adjacent voxels in the cluster with
t > 3.61, p < 0.003; minimum
cluster volume of 100 mm3).
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Differential effects of faces and moral stimuli on
brain activation
To rule out the possibility that activations were attributable
solely to the presence of faces in the moral pictures, we also analyzed
the data by creating regressors that represented (1) pictures
displaying people and faces from nonmoral conditions and (2) moral
pictures. These regressors were balanced, each containing an equal
number of time points. Regions more strongly activated by faces
compared with moral pictures were found in the fusiform gyri (BA 19),
right lingual/inferior occipital gyrus (BA 18), and right intraparietal
sulcus (BA 7/19). Regions more strongly activated by moral pictures
compared with faces included the medial OFC/MedFG (BA 10/11), inferior
frontal gyrus (BA 45), anterior temporal cortex (BA 21/38), posterior
STS (BA 21/39), and both amygdala. These results demonstrate that the
medial OFC/MedFG and posterior STS are centrally involved in processing
pictures with high moral content, in contrast to the confirmed role of the fusiform gyrus in face processing (Kanwisher et al., 1997 ). The
consistency of these activations with regard to previous studies and to
our predictions confirms that subjects were effectively attending to
the stimuli.
Condition-dependent changes in the connectivity of the
medial OFC
To investigate further the brain circuits involved in moral
processing, we studied condition-dependent changes in "functional connectivity" to test the hypothesis that a specific network of regions mediates the processing of stimuli with high socio-moral content. This approach identifies changes in the differential coupling
among brain regions (i.e., it highlights the contribution of one area
to the signal measured in other areas as a function of the experimental
condition) (Friston et al., 1997 ). We tested whether there were
condition-specific changes in the functional connectivity of the right
medial OFC, which was the most consistent prefrontal activation related
to moral stimuli, with all other voxels in the brain. When the moral
condition was compared with the unpleasant condition, there was a
highly specific and statistically significant increase in connectivity
between the medial OFC and the STS, the precuneus, and the same
regions of the MedFG described above (Fig.
6). The opposite comparison, unpleasant
versus moral, did not reveal increases in connectivity between the
medial OFC and the STS or other sectors of the prefrontal cortex.
Instead, the medial OFC increased its connectivity with the
extrastriate visual cortex. These results were reliable despite the use
of a relatively long TR of 5 sec, which could have decreased our ability to gauge functional connectivity changes.

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Figure 6.
Brain regions showing an increase in functional
connectivity with the medial OFC in the moral condition relative to the
unpleasant condition. For this analysis, the mean signal time courses
of the right medial OFC cluster (center coordinate,
x = 17, y = 42, z = 7) were obtained from each subject (from the
same cluster coordinates). Linear regression detected any voxel in the
brain that increased its coupling with the signal of the right OFC. The
statistical threshold was set at p < 0.002 (uncorrected), adjacent voxels in the cluster with
p < 0.005 (t > 2.8), and a
minimum cluster volume of 50 mm3. There was a marked
increase in coupling of the right medial OFC with the MedFG, superior
temporal sulcus, and precuneus.
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DISCUSSION |
Our results show that viewing moral and nonmoral unpleasant visual
stimuli activates a common network of brain areas that includes the
amygdala, insula, thalamus, and upper midbrain. The medial OFC/MedFG
and posterior STS were also recruited for processing emotionally
charged moral stimuli. Behavioral results confirmed that the effects
related to moral stimuli cannot be explained on the basis of the levels
of emotional valence or visual arousal alone.
Moral emotions differ from basic emotions in that they are
intrinsically interpersonal. Therefore, it was expected that moral emotions would share common neural substrates with tasks that invoke
social schemas and behaviors, as well as inferences about the mental
states of others. Imaging studies have implicated the ventral and
medial prefrontal cortex in theory-of-mind tasks (Fletcher et al.,
1995 ) and in the generation of emotional plans (Partiot et al., 1995 ).
Brain-lesion studies have linked these regions to the development and
maturation of moral, social, and emotional behavior (Eslinger et al.,
1992 ; Anderson et al., 1999 ). The lateral superior temporal cortex,
activated here when viewing moral pictures, plays an important role in
the perception of social signs (Adolphs, 1999 ; Haxby et al., 2000 ). The
present findings of preferential STS activation associated with moral
stimuli and fusiform activation in response to face stimuli suggest
that the STS may be involved in more complex social cognition
mechanisms, whereas the fusiform gyrus might be more specifically
linked to the processing of facial features per se (Kanwisher et al.,
1997 ; Adolphs, 1999 ; Haxby et al., 2000 ). Unpublished observations from
our group show that similar regions of the medial prefrontal cortex and
STS are engaged when normal individuals are presented with statements
evocative of moral emotions, compared with neutral statements and
statements evocative of unpleasant, but nonmoral emotions. The stronger
activation of the medial OFC and STS in response to both visual and
lexical moral stimuli suggests that this network may be involved in
moral processing regardless of the physical attributes of the stimuli.
Moral processing has been suggested to differ between men and women
(Gilligan, 1993 ). Our study was not specifically designed to address
gender effects on brain activation; however, visual inspection of the
data show that the amygdala, STS, and medial OFC/MedFG were similarly
activated in male and female subjects in response to moral and nonmoral
stimuli. This indicates that both genders contributed to the findings
reported above. Future imaging studies should address this relevant
issue more directly in larger subject groups.
OFC and automatic emotional processing
The OFC is an important mediator of automatic responses that guide
motivated behavior (Damasio et al., 2000 ) and of implicit social-emotional appraisals (Damasio, 1994 ; Rolls et al., 1994 ; Milne
and Grafman, 2001 ). The ventral and medial portions of the prefrontal
cortex have been consistently activated in functional imaging studies
of decision making related to reward and punishment (O'Doherty et al.,
2001 ) and empathic and moral judgments (Farrow et al., 2001 ; Greene et
al., 2001 ; Moll et al., 2001 ). Importantly, these studies have required
explicit responses from subjects. In contrast, our task engaged
subjects not as agents, but as observers, because no overt responses or
explicit executive operations were required. Nevertheless, viewing
pictures with moral content specifically activated the medial
OFC/MedFG. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the
OFC is involved in implicit executing behaviors that rely on the
evaluation of reinforcement associations between environmental stimuli
(Rolls et al., 1994 ). The medial OFC/MedFG, together with the STS and
limbic-subcortical regions, may play an important role in the rapid
and automatic detection of social-emotional events and in the
induction of the cognitive, emotional, and motivational dispositions
that have been proposed by modern theories as the bases of moral
sensitivity and behavior (Gilligan, 1993 ; Rozin et al., 1999 ; Greene et
al., 2001 ; Haidt, 2002 ).
Moral emotion, moral judgment, and moral behavior
Patients who sustain damage to the medial OFC may have the ability
to make moral and social judgments in laboratory settings even when
their moral behavior in real-life situations is abnormal (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985 ; Saver and Damasio, 1991 ). We suggest that
an impaired ability to automatically and rapidly process moral emotions
in response to signs of moral violations may be a critical mechanism
underlying this dissociation. This hypothesis is in line with
psychological studies showing that moral behavior covaries with moral
emotion more than with moral judgment (Haidt, 2001 ). Preston and de
Waal (2002) have suggested that the automatic nature of this process is
a pervasive feature of social-emotional perception-action mechanisms.
We reported previously that brain activation patterns are elicited by
an explicit moral reasoning task (Moll et al., 2001 ). In that study,
normal individuals were asked to judge statements with moral content
(e.g., "we break the law when necessary") and factual statements
devoid of moral connotations (e.g., "stones are lighter than
water") as right or wrong. Group results showed activations
predominantly in the frontopolar cortex, more rostrally than those
reported here. Similar results have been reported by other
investigators (Greene et al., 2001 ). Together, these results suggest
that, in comparison with the automatic processing performed by the OFC
in moral emotions, explicit moral reasoning may engage additional
prefrontal regions (Eslinger et al., 2002 ).
In summary, based on our present and previous results, we suggest that
the medial OFC/MedFG and the STS are critical elements of a
cortical-limbic network that enables humans to link emotional experience to moral appraisals.
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FOOTNOTES |
Received Nov. 16, 2001; revised Jan. 7, 2002; accepted Jan. 8, 2002.
We thank J. Grafman for valuable discussions and J. Weisberg for
comments on drafts of this manuscript.
Correspondence should be addressed to Jorge Moll, Neuroimaging
and Behavioral Neurology Group, Hospitais D'Or and LABS, R. Pinheiro Guimarães 22, 4th floor, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 22281-081, Brazil. E-mail: jmoll{at}neuroimage.com.
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