Abstract
Animals deal with predictable and unpredictable events on a daily basis. Yet our knowledge of the cognitive processes involved in decisions remains limited. We tested capuchins, macaques and orang-utans in a food-gambling task to investigate whether or not individuals estimate the chances of different outcomes. Results highlighted that gambling decisions were negatively induced by the probability of losing and the frequency of previous losses, and positively induced by the probability of gaining. Actual decisions were consistent with first order stochastic dominance. The study of second order stochastic dominance revealed that macaques were risk-prone whereas capuchins and orang-utans were risk-adverse. We detected responses comparable to the hot-hand effect, a bias found in humans. Capuchins and orang-utans exhibited probability distortion and loss aversion, which were not systematically found in macaques. Given the heterogeneity among individuals, we implemented mixture models and showed that attitudes towards risk and probabilities play complementary and different roles in the three species.
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Notes
The first combinations, i.e. those involving a high probability of getting a large cookie, were tested at the rate of one series of 12 trials per day.
There are also two-parameter weighting functions (see for example, Lattimore et al. 1992, and Prelec 1998) that separately control the inflexion point and curvature. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) suggest that one-parameter weighting functions and one-parameter value functions provide an excellent and parsimonious fit of data at an aggregate level.
Formally, we keep the notation of the difference ΔCPT between the prospective utility of each individual choice and the prospective utility of the certain outcome. This last value is 0.
The hot hand effect is observed when a series of gains increases the willingness to take future risks; it is related to the illusion of control (Langer 1975). The positive impact of the average quantitative outcome received previously could also be attributed to the house money effect; however, as subjects cannot bet their cumulated outcomes like humans, we can only retain the hot hand effect explanation here.
We tested many specifications and present only our best ones here. Other results are obtainable upon request.
We thank K. Chen for this valuable insight on our regression results.
In our estimation we consider the residuals from the same subject to be potentially correlated and correct for this fact when calculating standard errors of estimates.
As CPT is over-identified with the estimation of 4 parameters in choices where only outcome probabilities vary, here we assume that values are roughly linear in the range of gains and losses (i.e. α = β = 1).
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We are grateful to C. Arnaud, M. Arnaud, A. Coulon, P.Y. Hell, C. Morin, A. Leroy and A. Ouvrard for their participation in experiments with monkeys, and to M. Lohse, N. Romanowsky and S. Schorr for their assistance with the orang-utans. We are also grateful to C. Sueur and N. Poulin for statistical advice. We thank M. Bowler and J. Lignot for proofreading and K. Chen and P. Roger for their helpful comments on the manuscript. The research was supported by a grant from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-08-BLAN-0042-01).
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Pelé, M., Broihanne, M.H., Thierry, B. et al. To bet or not to bet? Decision-making under risk in non-human primates. J Risk Uncertain 49, 141–166 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-014-9202-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-014-9202-3
Keywords
- Risk
- Decision-making
- First order and second order stochastic dominance
- Expected utility theory
- Cumulative prospect theory
- Rank dependent expected utility theory
- Mixture models
- Non-human primates