Abstract
How do we make choices for others with different preferences from our own? Although neuroimaging studies implicate similar circuits in representing preferences for oneself and others, some models propose that additional corrective mechanisms come online when choices for others diverge from one's own preferences. Here we used event-related potentials (ERPs) in humans, in combination with computational modeling, to examine how social information is integrated in the time leading up to choices for oneself and others. Hungry male and female participants with unrestricted diets selected foods for themselves, a similar unrestricted eater, and a dissimilar, self-identified healthy eater. Across choices for both oneself and others, ERP value signals emerged within the same time window but differentially reflected taste and health attributes based on the recipient's preferences. Choices for the dissimilar recipient were associated with earlier activity localized to brain regions implicated in social cognition, including temporoparietal junction. Finally, response-locked analysis revealed a late ERP component specific to choices for the similar recipient, localized to the parietal lobe, that appeared to reflect differences in the response threshold based on uncertainty. A multi-attribute computational model supported the link between specific ERP components and distinct model parameters, and was not significantly improved by adding time-dependent dual processes. Model simulations suggested that longer response times previously associated with effortful correction may alternatively arise from higher choice uncertainty. Together, these results provide a parsimonious neurocomputational mechanism for social decision-making, additionally explaining divergent patterns of choice and response time data in decisions for oneself and others.
SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How do we choose for others, particularly when they have different preferences? Whereas some studies suggest that similar neural circuits underlie decision-making for oneself and others, others argue for additional, slower perspective-taking mechanisms. Combining event-related potentials with computational modeling, we found that integration of others' preferences occurs over the same timescale as for oneself while differentially tracking recipient-relevant attributes. Although choosing for others took longer and produced differences in late-emerging neural responses, computational modeling attributed these patterns to greater response caution rather than egocentric bias correction. Computational simulations also correctly predicted when and why choosing differently for others takes longer, suggesting that a model incorporating value integration and evidence accumulation can parsimoniously account for complex patterns in social decision-making.
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