Second Guessing in Perceptual Decision-Making

Abstract

Human subjects of both sexes were asked to make a perceptual decision between multiple directions of visual motion. In addition to reporting a primary choice, they also had to report a second guess, indicating which of the remaining options they would rather bet on, assuming that they got their primary choice wrong. The second guess was clearly informed by the amounts of sensory evidence that were provided for the different options. A single computational integration-to-threshold model, based on the assumption that the second guess is determined by the rank ordering of accumulated evidence at or shortly after the time of the decision, was able to explain the distribution of primary choices, associated response times, and the distribution of second guesses. This suggests that the decision-maker has access to how well supported unchosen options are by the sensory evidence.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Perceptual decisions require conversion of sensory evidence into a discrete choice. Computational models based on the accumulation of evidence to a decision threshold can explain the distribution of choices and associated decision times. Subjects are also able to report the level of confidence in their decision. Here we show that, when making decisions between more than two alternatives, the decision-maker can even report a second guess that is clearly informed by the sensory evidence. These second guesses show a distribution that is consistent with subjects having access to how much sensory evidence was accumulated for the unchosen options. The decision-maker therefore has knowledge about the outcome of the decision process that goes beyond just the choice and an associated confidence.