On the Role of Theory and Modeling in Neuroscience

Levenstein et al. aptly highlight some of the foundational issues in theoretical neuroscience, such as the role of abstraction and idealization in providing scientific explanations and understanding, and distinguishing under which conditions neuroscientific models provide genuine explanations, or mere descriptions, predictions, or control.

The authors rightly emphasize that philosophers of science can also gain valuable insights from the vast body of neuroscience literature, by employing methods of digital humanities, such as text mining, in line with the cognitive metascience approach (Miłkowski, 2023).

Conversely, neuroscientists can benefit from the latest research in philosophy of science, particularly on the epistemic norms of diverse kinds of explanations in neuroscience, e.g., topological (Kostić, 2020), computational (Miłkowski, 2013; Chirimuuta, 2018), dynamical (Favela, 2020), and functional (Egan, 2017). Understanding the diverse goals of theories is conducive to fruitful exploratory and explanatory scientific practice. Some forms of scientific understanding are not always grounded in explanations, but also in diverse theoretical representations, e.g., diagrams, taxonomies, and diagnostic manuals (Miłkowski, 2023). Philosophical theories of understanding can also integrate different kinds of explanations in a single framework (Khalifa et al., 2022).

The need for these interdisciplinary connections is particularly vivid in the case of network models that are increasingly being used in neuroscience (Kostić et al., 2020), and especially when it comes to evaluating their explanatory power (Kostić, 2020; Kostić and Khalifa, 2023).

In conclusion, we strongly support Levenstein et al.'s call for greater collaboration between philosophers of science and neuroscientists on the foundational issues in neuroscience. Embracing this interdisciplinary approach is essential for advancing our knowledge of the brain and its function.

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