Conceptual representations in mind and brain: theoretical developments, current evidence and future directions

Conceptual representations in long-term memory crucially contribute to perception and action, language and thought. However, the precise nature of these conceptual memory traces is discussed controversially. In particular, the grounding of concepts in the sensory and motor brain systems is the focus of a current debate. Here, we review theoretical accounts of the structure and neural basis of conceptual memory and evaluate them in light of recent empirical evidence. Models of conceptual processing can be distinguished along four dimensions: (i) amodal versus modality-specific, (ii) localist versus distributed, (iii) innate versus experience-dependent, and (iv) stable versus flexible. A systematic review of behavioral and neuroimaging studies in healthy participants along with brain-damaged patients will then be used to evaluate the competing theoretical approaches to conceptual representations. These findings indicate that concepts are flexible, distributed representations comprised of modality-specific conceptual features. Conceptual features are stored in distinct sensory and motor brain areas depending on specific sensory and motor experiences during concept acquisition. Three important controversial issues are highlighted, which require further clarification in future research: the existence of an amodal conceptual representation in the anterior temporal lobe, the causal role of sensory and motor activation for conceptual processing and the grounding of abstract concepts in perception and action. We argue that an embodiment view of conceptual representations realized as distributed sensory and motor cell assemblies that are complemented by supramodal integration brain circuits may serve as a theoretical framework to guide future research on concrete and abstract concepts.